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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses the question of whether the ﬁndings of behavioral economics imply that techniques
used in cost-beneﬁt analysis should be modiﬁed. The ﬁndings of behavioral economics considered include the
status-quo eﬀect, loss-aversion, overconﬁdence and hyperbolic discounting. These behavioral phenomena do
indeed imply that concepts from cost-beneﬁt analysis such as consumer surplus, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion,
shadow-price valuation, and time discounting, need to be modiﬁed. The most important modiﬁcations
follow from the status-quo eﬀect, which provides a new reason to reject policy proposals that yield only
small percentage beneﬁts relative to costs.
I. INTRODUCTION
The last 10 years have seen behavioral economics gain increasing attention among academic and popular
audiences (Schwartz 1998). Deﬁned as the application of psychology (and other related behavioral sciences) to
economics, research in behavioral economics has led to a series of discoveries showing that typical consumers
systematically deviate from the rationality assumptions which are commonly invoked in traditional economic
analysis. Although these “behavioral anomalies” are by now widely accepted descriptions of how consumers
actually behave (Laibson and Zeckhauser 1998), the key ﬁndings of behavioral economics have yet to inﬂuence
the way many policy-oriented economists arrive at policy prescriptions (Knetsch 1995).
The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the workhorse of applied normative economics — cost-beneﬁt
analysis — and ask whether the ﬁndings of behavioral economics point toward a new framework for normative
analysis. In particular, four well-documented behavioral anomalies are considered: the status-quo eﬀect, loss-
aversion, overconﬁdence, and hyperbolic discounting. In each case, this paper analyzes the consequences of
these descriptive behavioral phenomena for the fundamental normative elements of cost-beneﬁt analysis:
consumer surplus, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, time discounting, and the shadow-price approach to valuation.
II. THE STATUS-QUO EFFECT
The status-quo eﬀect refers to any instance where subjective valuations of an object depend on whether
the object is being acquired or given up. Perhaps the most famous example of the status-quo eﬀect is an
experiment by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990), where experimental subjects were found to demand
roughly twice as much money in order to give up a coﬀee mug (which they had been given earlier) than
they were willing to pay to acquire it. The status-quo eﬀect contradicts the idea that willingness to pay is
a good indication of how much compensation should be given for taking away a good or service which is
currently being consumed. For example, when the status-quo eﬀect is present, the average amount residents
of a particular neighborhood are willing to pay in order to acquire a new park (where there is currently no
park) will generally be less than the amount those residents need to be compensated in order to accept the
removal of a park already in existence.
This section argues that the status-quo eﬀect, when taken seriously as a usual aspect of human prefer-
ences rather than disparaged as an instance of “irrationality,” implies that fewer policy changes are socially
desirable than otherwise would be the case. For instance, if a policy change causes winners to receive $1,000
and losers to lose $800 (with equal numbers of each), even a $900 transfer from winners to losers may not be
enough to oﬀset the disutility associated with moving away from the status quo. Those who lose an object
or service with a market price of $800 may require compensation of signiﬁcantly more than $800 in order
to be “made whole.” If one accepts that this aspect of preferences is widespread and ought to be acknowl-
edged in policy analysis, then the status-quo eﬀect leads to increased conservatism with respect to the status
quo, whereby projects with only slightly positive net beneﬁts will not be socially desirable. Because of the
status-quo eﬀect, the psychic loss from change itself must be explicitly accounted for or, equivalently, the
behavioral cost-beneﬁt decision rule should become, “Adopt the proposed policy only if net beneﬁts exceed
a prespeciﬁed threshold (strictly greater than zero).”
The status-quo eﬀect implies that the consumption of a commodity at time t, denoted xt, yields varying
levels of utility depending on what was consumed previously, denoted xt−1. This generates a new implication
about preferences over streams of consumption through time. In particular, consider the consumption path
from time 0 to time T :
1, 1, 1, ..., xt, (1 + ), (1 + ), ..., (1 + ). (1)
This consumption path increases through time, aside from the possible exception of xt which is free to be
bigger or less than 1. With the status-quo eﬀect, the consumption path in (1) would be preferred over a
consumption path with equal present value in which the consumer gets to consume more early on and winds
up with less at the end, such as
(1 + γT−t+1), (1 + γT−t+1), (1 + γT−t+1), ..., xt, 1, 1, ..., 1, (2)
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor used in computing the present value of consumption paths.
An important consequence of this for policy planning is that sustainable projects should be favored over
those with mostly short-run beneﬁts. Plans where the beneﬁts increase over the life of the project are
preferred over other consumption streams with equal present value, simply because there is less pain for
consumers to bear in parting with the level of consumption to which they become accustomed. With this
interpretation of habituation rather than that of giving up an actual physical object, the status-quo eﬀect is
sometimes referred to in connection with a variety of related phenomena under headings such as “reference-
point dependent preferences,” “habit formation,” “the endowment eﬀect,” and “the framing eﬀect.”
Another key normative concept from cost-beneﬁt analysis is the Kaldor-Hicks principle, which is often
invoked when considering a policy change that aﬀects some people adversely while beneﬁtting others. The
Kaldor-Hicks principle holds that if the winners could (at least theoretically) compensate the losers so that
they feel no worse oﬀ than before, and still wind up with a net surplus, then the policy change under
consideration should be adopted. The main consequence of the status-quo eﬀect here is that the Kaldor-
Hicks principle becomes more stringent. This is because there is a gap in perspectives between winners and
losers, where a larger transfer of beneﬁts is required to make losers feel indiﬀerent rather than hostile to
policy changes.
For example, one may consider the pros and cons of being sent $600 in the mail from the government in
the eyes of voters who exhibit the status-quo eﬀect. A nearly identical policy was actually implemented by
the Bush Administration in 2001 as part of a tax-cutting ﬁscal stimulus plan. One problem with the policy
that traditional cost-beneﬁt analysis overlooks is that the psychic beneﬁt from being sent $600 in the mail
is signiﬁcantly smaller than the psychic cost of giving up an additional $600 of lost government beneﬁts (or
lost income in the form of additional taxes) required in order to pay for the beneﬁt. By the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion, the status-quo eﬀect implies that fewer projects and policy changes will be worthwhile, calling for
a generally conservative attitude with respect to the status quo.
A second example involving the Kaldor-Hicks principle centers on the question of whether monetary or
ﬁscal policy is better suited for smoothing business cycles. Although the current thinking of most macro-
economists favors monetary policy (Abel and Bernanke 2001, p. 417), the status-quo eﬀect adds at least
one new point in favor of ﬁscal policy as a tool for stimulating national output during economic downturns.
When a central bank cuts interest rates to stimulate output, this amounts to a transfer from savers to bor-
rowers. The social beneﬁt to borrowers is probably less than the loss of utility suﬀered by savers, owing to
the status-quo eﬀect. On the other hand, the dis-utility borne by future generations who are asked to pay for
today’s increases in government spending may similarly outweigh the beneﬁts of business-cycle smoothing
today. The increased tax bills owed by future generations will not, however, be accompanied by the same
degree of psychic pain in moving from a low to a high tax bill, because many future consumers will simply
not be old enough to remember the lower tax rates. Therefore, borrowing from future generations in order
to ﬁnance more government spending today may be better than using monetary policy to achieve the same
goal, although the morality of such a plan may be called into question.
Next, the consequences of the status-quo eﬀect for “consumer surplus” and “producer surplus” analysis
of costs and beneﬁts are considered. The conventional eﬃciency analysis using the concept of consumer
surplus nearly always suggests that cutting taxes is an unambiguously “good thing.” If a tax on producers is
reduced, the lost revenue is more than oﬀset by increased producer surplus and additional consumers surplus,
depicted graphically in introductory textbooks as regaining a portion of the “deadweight loss” attributable
to the higher-tax status quo.
In symbols, the conventional analysis states that lost tax revenue (R) is oﬀset by an even greater amount
of surplus (R + deadweight loss) in the wake of a tax cut. The status-quo eﬀect may, however, turn this
result on its head. Because of the status-quo eﬀect, it cannot be assumed that the change in utility associated
with a gain in R is equal to the change in utility associated with a loss of R. In fact, when the disparity
between willingness to acquire R and willingness to accept losing R is sizable, and the deadweight loss is
not so large (i.e., when the supply or demand curve is inelastic), then it is entirely possible that the utility
lost in giving up R dollars worth of beneﬁts is greater than the increase in utility associated with gaining a
new beneﬁt of R + deadweight loss. In light of the status-quo eﬀect, the normative implication regarding
tax cuts is ambiguous. Although there is more aggregate surplus with a tax cut, the increase in utility due
to cutting taxes may not oﬀset the loss of utility associated with public expenditures at its status-quo level.
Finally, the shadow-price approach to valuing a public good, another of the key normative elements of
cost-beneﬁt analysis, is re-considered here in light of the status-quo eﬀect. If one models a policy-maker’s
decision process as a maximization problem (where the objective function depends on a list of variables under
the decision-maker’s control and another list of factors which are not), then the shadow price of a resource
is deﬁned as the increase in the maximized value of the objective function that results from increasing the
availability of that resource by one unit. For example, if a consumer maximizes the utility function u(x, y)
subject to the budget constraint pxx+ pyy = W (where W is the consumer’s wealth, and px and py are the
respective prices of x and y), then the shadow price of money is the change in maximized utility that results
from an extra dollar of wealth. This approach is very general and widely used for valuing a public good or a
ﬁnite resource, assuming that all other resources are eﬃciently allocated. That is, changes in social welfare
represent comparisons of two maximized values.
The key point with regard to shadow prices is to ask whether the meaning attached to them requires
modiﬁcation because of the new stylized facts of behavioral economics that have emerged in the last decade
and a half. In the case of the status-quo eﬀect, new diﬃculties in using shadow price valuation do in fact arise.
For the purpose of illustrating these diﬃculties, let V (x; z) denote the social welfare function, where z denotes
the policy-maker’s control variable and x denotes the decision of a representative consumer. Supposing that
the policy question under consideration is whether to increase z or not, the standard cost-beneﬁt approach
dictates that the policy-maker should compare the cost of increasing z one unit with the marginal beneﬁt
∂maxxV (x;z)
∂z .
The diﬃculty that the status-quo eﬀect causes relates to whether this derivative is the same on the right
as on the left. Although it may seem at ﬁrst glance to be a dull technical detail, there is a substantive
question about human behavior at the heart of the issue of left- and right-hand sided derivatives as they
concern the status-quo eﬀect. If the lost utility from losing 1 unit of z is bigger than the utility gained
by increasing z one unit, even for arbitrarily small units, then consumer preferences exhibit the status-quo
eﬀect, and the social welfare function is discontinuous at the threshold point. In contrast, when V is a
smooth function of z, it can be arbitrarily well approximated by a linear function, meaning that “change to
the left” and “change to the right” are equal when those changes are small. The status-quo eﬀect, however,
implies that the left-hand-side derivative does not equal the right-hand-side derivative at the status quo z0.
Formally, the status-quo eﬀect can be deﬁned in this context by the inequality
V (x∗; z0 + )− V (x∗; z0)

<
V (x∗; z0)− V (x∗; z0 − )

, (3)
where the maximizer of V in x is denoted x∗. In words, this equation says that the social gain of moving from
the status quo z0 to z0 +  is less than the gain achieved by staying with the status quo instead of reducing
z0 to z0 − . As before, the social cost of reducing beneﬁts (which is the right-hand side of (3)) exceeds the
social gain of increasing beneﬁts (on the left-hand side), making it necessary to distinguish between gains
and losses when evaluating the net beneﬁts of policy proposals.
An anonymous referee pointed out that any enlightened cost-beneﬁt analysis would already account for
the costs of moving away from the status quo without needing behavioral economics to make this point.
I agree that reasonable observers earnestly considering the impact of a policy proposal would think about
the pain of change itself, without ever consulting the behavioral economics literature. However, the use
of comparative statics, perhaps the dominant technique for evaluating the desirability of changes in policy
parameters, is founded on the idea that adjustment costs are negligible. The rationale is that, if the pain
of adjusting to a new equilibrium (after exogenous parameters change) is bounded, then it still makes sense
to switch to a new equilibrium in which the economic pie is epsilon bigger, because the beneﬁts at the new
equilibrium will accumulate indeﬁnitely into the future.
The contribution of behavioral economics is to give demonstrable evidence that preferences depend on the
status quo. Of course it remains unclear how policy makers ought to weight the before- and after- preferences
of an individual whose preferences change because of a policy intervention. What is clear, however, is that
traditional comparative statics give 100 percent weighting to the post-intervention preferences. If one places
weight on pre-intervention preferences instead, then fewer new policy proposals will be seen as desirable.
III. LOSS AVERSION
Loss aversion, in contrast to risk aversion, characterizes preferences that are risk-loving over losses, and
risk-averse over gains. This is not the only deﬁnition in circulation, however. Some authors describe as
“loss averse” any expected utility function that is “kinked” at the status quo, with the slope to the right-
hand side (over gains) strictly less than the slope to the left-hand side. This kinked utility function that
weights losses heavier than gains is equivalent to the status-quo eﬀect discussed in the previous section.
Therefore, this section focuses on the ﬁrst deﬁnition, i.e., risk-aversion over gains and attraction to risk
when evaluating uncertain losses. See Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991) for evidence, deﬁnitions, and
background information relating loss aversion to other behavioral “anomalies.”
Focusing on the risk-loving/risk-averting deﬁnition, loss aversion can be characterized in terms of concav-
ity and convexity of the expected utility function. Of course, risk-averse preferences (subject to regularity
conditions described in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 1995 pp. 167-173) can be represented by a globally
concave expected utility function. Loss-averse preferences, on the other hand, are represented by an expected
utility function that is concave over gains (relative to a threshold level of payoﬀs which may, for convenience,
be taken to be zero) and convex over losses.
The idea behind loss aversion is that consumers, on average, are risk averse over gains but would prefer
to gamble when dealing with losses ( Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 1991). For example, a loss-averse
consumer might prefer $500 with probability 1 over ﬂipping a fair coin generating payoﬀs of $1000 or
$0, reﬂecting risk aversion over positive payoﬀs. But when asked to decide between giving up $500 with
probability 1 or ﬂipping the fair coin generating losses of either $1000 or $0, that same consumer, if she is
loss averse, prefers to gamble.
Loss aversion raises potentially serious issues for policy-makers, because the collective will of voters may
support action that takes big gambles with extremely bad outcomes. Under loss-aversion, once things are
bad, i.e., once payoﬀs are suﬃciently negative, the additional loss in utility from losing more is negligible.
For instance, in contemplating a nuclear accident where 10,000 people die and a costly safety measure that
might help reduce deaths to 1,000, loss-averse policy-makers and voters may not place much value on avoiding
9,000 deaths. The reason is that 1,000 deaths is already so terrible that an additional loss of 9,000 lives
causes far less dis-utility than nine times the dis-utility of 1,000 deaths. Loss averse preferences may lead
decision-makers to develop projects that might cause catastrophes, i.e., policies which are objectively bad
from a pure frequency point of view (negative expected payoﬀs) but which seem reasonable to most people
because “very bad” outcomes are penalized only slightly more than merely “bad” outcomes are.
Given this propensity to not place much weight on extremely bad outcomes, the public may fail to
demand enough compensation to cover the expected losses associated with a new risk accompanying a policy
change. This causes a problem for those relying on the Kaldor-Hicks principle in justifying their policy
ideas, because ex ante subjective beneﬁts are so far out of line with ex post reality. The following numerical
example illustrates how a loss-averse voter may accept compensation that is far less than the expected loss
associated with taking on a new risk.
Suppose the expected utility function
u(x) = x0.5 if x > 0 and u(x) = −(−x)0.5 if x < 0 (4)
represents a loss averse voter’s preferences. Then this voter will accept being subjected to the gamble
“negative $10,000 with probability 0.5 and $0 with probability 0.5” in exchange for $50, even though the
expected loss from this policy change is $5,000.
This possibility that society will unwittingly accept risks with negative net expected payoﬀs implies that
loss aversion should be explicitly considered in analyzing policy issues where there is a small probability
of catastrophe. (See Kunreuther 1996 for more applications of behavioral theory to the applied problem of
disaster insurance.) Nuclear arms, genetically modiﬁed agriculture, and unilateral military action are leading
examples of such issues.
Loss aversion has other surprising consequences for the key normative elements of cost-beneﬁt analysis.
For one thing, demand curves may slope upward as a result of loss aversion. To understand why, one may
think of a two-state payoﬀ problem where there is an “up” state with a positive payoﬀ and a “down” state
with negative payoﬀ. In order to increase the down-state payoﬀ, the up-state payoﬀ must be reduced, because
payoﬀs are scarce. Optimality for an interior choice of the down-state payoﬀ requires equalizing marginal
beneﬁts across both states. When the price of down-state beneﬁt (in terms of up-state beneﬁt forgone) goes
up, the up-state payoﬀ falls and marginal utility in the up-state increases. To equate marginal beneﬁts across
both states, the marginal beneﬁt in the down-state must be brought up. But because the expected utility
function is convex in the region of negative payoﬀs, this means that the down-state payoﬀ must be increased.
Thus, the demand for down-state payoﬀs is an increasing function of own price, at least over a certain range.
Upward sloping demand curves change the standard consumer surplus analysis signiﬁcantly. When
market demand is increasing in price, taxing producers can cause consumer surplus to rise, although there
is still a deadweight loss to consider in terms of aggregate surplus. It may only be a theoretical curiosity,
but when demand slopes upward, it is actually possible to increase aggregate surplus by taxing consumers,
although this involves a sizable transfer of surplus away from consumers. If the distribution of surplus
among consumers and producers is a concern, then the consumer-welfare-improving tax on producers may
be a relevant alternative for policy-makers to explore.
Finally, the implication of loss aversion for the shadow-price approach is considered. Whether there is
anything new in this regard depends on whether the expected utility function is kinked at the threshold
point (usually taken to be the zero-payoﬀ point) or not. The reason for this is entirely similar to the
issues at stake regarding discontinuity caused by the status-quo eﬀect. In short, loss aversion can lead
to discontinuities (although it does not follow necessarily) and, in such cases, shadow prices are poorly
deﬁned. If our attitudes jump discretely when considering even small losses compared to small gains, then
the expected utility function is kinked and shadow values at that value will not be equal when evaluated as
left-hand-side or right-hand-side derivatives. The meaning of this relates directly to the discrete diﬀerence
in marginal beneﬁt when considering losses as compared to gains.
IV. OVERCONFIDENCE
Overconﬁdence has been deﬁned in more than one way in the economics literature. The experimental evidence
regarding overconﬁdence is reviewed in Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998). For purposes of
re-considering cost-beneﬁt analysis, it is suﬃcient to deﬁne overconﬁdence as a systematic distortion in
consumer beliefs about the probability distributions of random variables in the economy that leads to an
artiﬁcially high level of demand. It is therefore meaningful to distinguish between an undistorted demand
curve (which would prevail if consumers’ beliefs matched objective probability distributions) and a distorted
or “overconﬁdent” demand curve that lies to the right of the undistorted demand curve (in Marshallian
price-quantity space).
If a policy-maker suspects that consumers are overconﬁdent and demand too much of a particular product,
e.g., smokers whose beliefs about the health consequences of their actions are systematically biased and
therefore demand too many cigarettes, then a tax (either on consumers or on producers) can restore the
market to the undistorted level of output. The partial-equilibrium surplus arguments against taxes do
not apply here, because excessive expenditure in one market implies under-expenditure in others, meaning
that a gap between prices and marginal social beneﬁts prevails. Thus, overconﬁdence and other behavioral
phenomena involving distorted beliefs about probability distributions imply that consumer surplus arguments
are inappropriate.
As for the Kaldor-Hicks principle, the willingness of those who lose under a new policy to accept com-
pensation in exchange for agreeing to the policy change will be distorted relative to the objective value of
beneﬁts and transfers. Systematically skewed perceptions must be brought in explicitly when invoking the
Kaldor-Hicks principle. On a case-by-case basis, the divergence between current perceptions about the value
of beneﬁts and transfers and objective values, if measurable, need to be considered in order to maximize
social welfare.
Similarly, shadow-price valuations can be systematically skewed because of overconﬁdence. “Distorted
demand” is nearly equivalent to “distorted marginal beneﬁt,” which ultimately leads to a distorted social
welfare function as long as consumer perceptions are taken at face value. This raises the question of whether
policy-makers should replace subjective beneﬁts of consumers which they feel are distorted with “corrected”
valuations. Policy-makers who distinguish between an objective demand curve and an overconﬁdent one will
subject themselves to the charge of paternalism. However, when there is compelling empirical evidence that
consumers make systematic mistakes, there is little ethical ground for asserting that policy-makers should,
in the name of consumer sovereignty, maximize social welfare as mis-perceived by consumers. It can be
concluded that, at this point, the normative implications of overconﬁdence are trickier to deal with than
those of the other behavioral phenomena discussed above.
V. HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING
If a consumer is indiﬀerent between $100 in seven days and $105 dollars in eight days, yet prefers $100 today
over $105 tomorrow, then that consumer’s attitudes toward time may be characterized as reﬂecting hyperbolic
discounting. When a consumer’s preferences exhibit hyperbolic discounting, it means that consumer is
impatient in the short-run and relatively patient in the long-run. Hyperbolic discounting has been put
forward as a leading explanation of phenomena such as procrastination in ﬁling income tax returns, the
will-power problems faced by dieters, the dilemmas faced by anyone planning for their own retirement, and
the policy problems surrounding social security programs (Rabin 1996).
A more formal characterization of hyperbolic discounting requires one to distinguish between consumption
at three points in time: x0, x1, and x2. At time 0, a hyperbolic discounter discounts the utility of consuming
x2, u(x2), by the discount factor γ2α, and discounts the utility of x1, u(x1), by the discount factor γα. The
relative discount rate of x2 in terms of x1 at t = 0 is simply γ
2α
γα = γ. The additional term α is a second
discount factor reﬂecting the myopia of hyperbolic discounters. To see this, consider that the discount rate
moving from time 0 to time 1 is γα, which is smaller than the discount rate moving from time 1 to time 2
(from the perspective of time 0). Thus, the hyperbolic discounter may be described as choosing x0, x1, x2 to
maximize the objective
u(x0) + αγu(x1) + αγ2u(x2). (5)
The essence of hyperbolic discounting is that the demand for x2 relative to x1 is greater at time 0 than it
is at time 1. At time 1, the myopic nature of the hyperbolic discounter dominates and x2 is seen as relatively
less valuable. But at time 0 when x1 and x2 are both in the future, x2 is a better substitute for x1. This
means that the demand curve for x2 as a function of the relative price of x2 in terms of x1 actually shifts
inward when moving from time 0 to time 1.
Consumer surplus is therefore sensitive to the period in which it is measured. And shadow prices are
diﬀerent at diﬀerent points in time. Perhaps most problematic of all, projects with beneﬁts far in the future
are under-valued from the perspective of tomorrow, while those with costs far in the future are over-valued
in the present.
Realizing that voters and policy-makers alike may exhibit hyperbolic discounting preferences is important.
When consumers or voters are thought to be hyperbolic discounters, there is a gap between how they value
relative beneﬁts in the present versus the future. Ethicists may debate which among a single individual’s
multiple time-dated preferences ought to prevail for the purposes of designing policy. But even without
waiting for a concrete answer to that diﬃcult problem, those who conduct cost-beneﬁt analysis will want
to consider the time-speciﬁc nature of valuations, and acknowledge the possibility that individual voters or
consumers may have a tendency to contradict themselves through time in their opinions on whether a project
is worthwhile or not.
In general, cost-beneﬁt decisions with immediate beneﬁts and deferred costs are the most likely to be
reversed through time, as voters who have hyperbolic discounting preferences move from assigning net
positive valuations to assigning net negative valuations for the same project. To counter this tendency, a
cost-beneﬁt analyst may want to consider using a set of discount factors that discount at a decelerating rate
(in contrast to the accelerating rate characterizing hyperbolic discounters). The rationale for this would be
to oﬀset subjective valuations that tend to be too present-oriented because of hyperbolic discounting. For
example, if cost-beneﬁt analysis calls for beneﬁts (and costs) one year from now to be discounted by a factor
of γ, then beneﬁts and costs two years from now could be discounted by less than γ2 to control for the
tendency of subjective valuations to place too much weight on the present. One such sequence of weights is
1 + γT − γ(T−t) (6)
for t = 0, 1, ..., T .
VI. SATISFICING
Herbert Simon (1957) popularized the notion that, due to cognitive limitations and computational com-
plexity, decision-makers often fail to maximize and instead search their choice set until a suﬃciently high
level of satisfaction is achieved — a decision process referred to as satisﬁcing. The important point is that
decision-makers do not typically maximize. Rather than maximize, those who satisﬁce experiment until
an action that is “good enough” is achieved. Therefore, in departing from the maximization framework
which is dominant within economics, satisﬁcing represents a radical break from tradition. In the context of
cost-beneﬁt analysis, satisﬁcing implies a number of further breaks with tradition. It is not straightforward,
however, to see how cost-beneﬁt analysis ought to be modiﬁed in light of what is known about satisﬁcing.
When consumers do not maximize, their demand curves can no longer be interpreted as “marginal
beneﬁt curves,” where marginal beneﬁts are measured along the price axis. In this case, the rationale for
using changes in consumer and producer surplus to analyze economic eﬃciency evaporates. Similarly, if
consumers do not maximize their own utility, one may reasonably wonder how a policy-maker can hope to
do so. What this means is that shadow prices are probably not well deﬁned and, even if they were, they
would be exceedingly diﬃcult to measure.
The Kaldor-Hicks criterion, on the other hand, may actually be easier to implement when large-scale
satisﬁcing prevails. Because consumers do not maximize, those who lose under new policies may not demand
anything more if they began from a point of satisfaction that comfortably exceeded their target level of
utility. The target level of utility, in turn, raises a variety of other issues in connection with responsible or
optimal policy-making. For instance, one wonders if there is any rationale at all for policy intervention if
those who beneﬁt are already happier than they “need” to be from the standpoint of their target utility. The
issue of whether policies designed to change the thresholds themselves are worthwhile is yet another deep
question which is raised by behavioral economics without being resolved. One counter-intuitive prospect to
keep in mind is that, as standards of living rise, so do most individuals’ utility targets, leading to a condition
where more people fall short of their target and live in a state of subjective deprivation as a consequence.
Such possibilities may complicate the meaning of “economic progress.”
VII. APPLICATION: DRINKING ON CAMPUS
At this stage, after reviewing how developments in behavioral economics force one to modify standard cost-
beneﬁt analysis, it is appropriate to ask whether the modiﬁcations, as a whole, are useful. The question is
whether behavioral economics points toward a new, more empirically valid normative procedure for answering
the prescriptive policy questions facing society. I assert that the answer to this question is “yes.” This positive
assessment must be qualiﬁed, however, with the acknowledgment that the ﬁndings of behavioral economics
do not always point clearly to speciﬁc modiﬁcations.
In order to explore how far one might progress in applying the behavioral cost-beneﬁt ideas described
above, it is helpful to take up a speciﬁc policy issue such as one which is being debated on the campus where I
work: whether a new pub located on our campus ought to be allowed to sell liquor. Due to space limitations,
a detailed account is not presented here. Rather, several modiﬁcations to the cost-beneﬁt analysis of liquor
on campus are outlined, each corresponding to one of the behavioral ﬁndings described above.
On the cost side, drinking on campus would require additional security, additional insurance premiums,
the administrative costs of acquiring a liquor license and engaging in the political struggle with city oﬃcials
(in Richardson, Texas, where retailers are currently forbidden from selling “hard” liquor), and an expected
loss of certain students whose families might be opposed by the idea of on-campus drinking. On the beneﬁt
side must be counted the increased pleasure and time savings of students and faculty who enjoy an atmosphere
in which drinks are sold. Additionally, students who live on campus would not need to drive home after
drinking, implying that the new policy might be expected to reduce drunk driving among the student body.
The sale of liquor on campus can also be expected to build a certain amount of new social capital in the form
of stronger friendships, more collaboration, and a greater accumulation of shared experiences that contribute
positively to socially constructive pursuits such as education, job placement, and alumni fund raising.
A basic modiﬁcation reﬂected in the behavioral cost-beneﬁt procedure follows from the status-quo eﬀect
and the idea that change, itself, is painful. The “change is painful” principle implies that the decision
rule dictating whether liquor on campus is a good idea or not, should not be “Sell alcohol if the beneﬁts
outweigh the costs.” Rather, the decision rule should be, owing to status-quo eﬀect, “Sell alcohol if the
beneﬁts outweigh the costs by a certain pre-speciﬁed amount.” Opponents and proponents should try to
agree in advance by how much beneﬁts must exceed costs in order for the policy proposal to be adopted.
They may want to use psychological studies and parameter estimates from other sources to quantify the
extent to which status-quo eﬀects are important. An agreeable policy rule might be: “If the ratio of beneﬁts
to costs exceeds 1.10, the policy should be implemented.” The extra 10 percent compensates for the “pain
of change” which is otherwise unaccounted for.
Loss aversion is relevant to the liquor on campus issue in placing values on extremely negative outcomes.
Knowing that loss-averse students and decision-makers have a propensity to gamble over extremely bad
outcomes, special care should be taken that the costs associated with an increase in student deaths, for
instance, are accounted for in line with objective frequencies insofar as they are available.
Overconﬁdence may or may not be relevant in the case of campus liquor policy. Overconﬁdence could
lead to exaggerated projected beneﬁts of having liquor on campus. But it could equally well lead to exag-
gerated projected beneﬁts of being a liquor-free campus. There seems to be no unambiguous implication of
overconﬁdence here.
Hyperbolic discounting could play a potentially important role in analyzing the liquor-on-campus policy
question. Many of the beneﬁts identiﬁed — those related to new social capital and better alumni fundraising
prospects — are payoﬀs that will accumulate relatively far into the future. Many of the costs, on the other
hand, e.g., the political costs and one-time start-up costs of implementing a new bar on campus, must be
dealt with in the near term. If the valuations of near-term and short-term beneﬁts are subject to decision-
makers who are hyperbolic discounters, then this will tend toward defeating the liquor-on-campus proposal.
In fact, it is common to hear administrators and students who are in a position to try gaining approval
on-campus liquor sales to articulate the view that, “It would take so long to go through all the hassles of
obtaining a liquor license that the ﬁght isn’t worth it.” At this point, should the cost-beneﬁt analyst take
this kind of heavy discounting of the distant future seriously, accepting it as the way consumers right now
actually feel? Or should some corrective weights be applied that give added weight to the future? If both
sides of this policy debate agreed that everyone concerned tends to be overly focused on the near-term and
that corrective measures ought to be taken, then a set of corrective weights, like those recommenced above,
might be considered. It should be noted, however, that this may contradict the spirit of earlier suggestions
to accept the status-quo eﬀect rather than to ignore it as an anomaly. Ultimately, policy makers must decide
which behavioral phenomena deserve standing in the analysis and which ought to be considered anomalous.
In ﬁnding dollar valuations for the increased utility of those who want alcohol on campus and the dis-
utility of those who do not, the non-equivalence of willingness to pay and willingness to be compensated for
having a policy change against one’s wishes should be taken into consideration. In this case, the amount
that alcohol-opponents would be willing to pay in order to change a “wet” campus to a “dry” campus would
underestimate what those opponents lose in moving from a dry campus to a wet campus, because of status-
quo eﬀects. Attention to this asymmetry of beneﬁts with respect to the status quo should be kept in mind
when determining dollar values for policy-related changes in subjective well being.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The approach outlined here begins with a short list of recently established behavioral tendencies which
are generally not considered in traditional economic analysis, and attempts to pro-actively avoid systematic
mistakes in public decision-making which may arise because of those behavioral tendencies. Rather than
merely implying that traditional cost-beneﬁt analysis is ﬂawed, the new stylized facts of behavioral economics
(which include the status-quo eﬀect, loss aversion, overconﬁdence, and hyperbolic discounting) actually point
to a constructive technique for modifying cost-beneﬁt analysis. The modiﬁed cost-beneﬁt analysis is referred
to here as “behavioral cost-beneﬁt analysis.”
Two criticisms are often leveled at the idea of drawing normative implications from behavioral economics.
This article, in several places, considered adjusting subjective valuations in order to correct for systematic
gaps between perceptions and objective outcomes that can lead to serious problems in the domain of public
policy. Many critics regard the idea of such adjustments as paternalistic. A second complaint comes from
those who are not convinced by the empirical record on which the behavioral phenomena discussed in this
article rest. To these critics, the modiﬁcations proposed here are viewed as ad hoc rationalizations for
tinkering with otherwise objective analysis. These charges can be at least partially refuted by turning back
to the experimental and ﬁeld research that led to the discovery and subsequent testing of the behavioral
phenomena discussed here. More research is underway to reﬁne our understanding of these phenomena, as
researchers subject these ideas to tougher and tougher tests.
In response to the second charge of making ad hoc assumptions, it should be pointed out that interest in
behavioral economics grew out of dissatisfaction with the ad hoc nature of traditional rationality assumptions
and their failure to match actual economic behavior. Including behavioral phenomena in cost-beneﬁt analysis
should instead be seen as an analytical choice that takes consumer preferences even more seriously than
before. Consequently, by insisting on beginning with a description of typical consumer behavior which is as
accurate as possible, more weight is given to testing out the basic assumptions and avoiding ad hoc modeling
choices. Ultimately, policy-making that rests on a set of descriptively false behavioral assumptions will be
less apt to do what voters want. Behavioral cost-beneﬁt analysis begins with this premise and attempts to
make good on the hope that improved empirical validity with regard to consumer behavior translates into
improved policy action.
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